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2Canada’s Demographic Future: Some Reflections on Projection Assumptions
Abstract
Projections since the start of the Canada Pension Plan have been reasonably accurate with
regard to population size, but they have under-projected population aging, and thus the ratio of
beneficiaries to contributors. A case is made for long terms assumptions including fertility of 1.6
births per woman, life expectancy of 85, and net immigration of 0.47 per 100 population. By
2026, there will be fewer than three persons aged 20-64 per person aged 65 and over, compared
to over six when the program was started.  According to medium projections, the proportion 20-
64 to 65+ will change from 4.9 in 2000 to 2.2 in 2100. This will also be in the context of a slower
growing and aging labour force.  Population policies are considered that would seek to avoid
population decline and reduce the pace of aging. 
Demographics take on a new meaning in a welfare state, as there is interest to determine the relative
well-being of various components of the population, and to plan for improvements.  Population
projections become more than an academic exercise.  For most activities of the welfare state, like
health, education and social security, short term projections are sufficient, but for pensions a long term
perspective becomes more important, particularly for having a sense of the change in  relative numbers
of contributors and recipients.
In this historical context, it is useful to observe that some of the first attempts to project Canada’s
population were rather disastrous.  Burton Hurd (1939: 494), who also wrote various census analytic
studies, projected that the population of Canada would reach 15.4 million in 1971.  At the end of the
war, demographers at the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, including Enid Charles and Nathan Keyfitz,
projected even lower figures.  They  projected that the 1971 population would be between 13.8 and
14.6 million (Charles et al., 1946: 19, 34).  They further estimated that the population would reach a
maximum of 15 million in 1990 (p.  5).  We now know that by 1951 the population already reached
14.0 million and by 1971 it was 21.6 million.  These projections essentially failed to foresee the baby
boom and they also anticipated that international migration would continue to be negligible, as it had
been during the depression and the war.
While the Dominion Bureau of Statistics was recovering from these disastrous results by not engaging in
projections, others were bolder at the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation and the Economic
Council of Canada.  Of course, these projections, associated with housing and economic futures could
focus on the relatively short term.  Least these institutions be off the hook, it is useful to observe that as
recently as its 26th annual review, the Economic Council of Canada (1989) was projecting mortality
3based on the deaths per 1000 population.  Having observed that the crude death rate had been
constant for some time, it was held constant to 2040 without realizing that this required a rather heroic
increase in life expectancy in an aging population.  For instance, the projections by Statistics Canada
(1990) were expecting the deaths per 1000 population to increase from 7.3 to 13.5 in forty years.
There are various things to criticize in the Statistics Canada projections after this agency took the lead in
projections after the 1971 census.  Nonetheless, it is useful to observe that the recorded numbers for
2000 on total population (30.8 million) are within the band of these four projections released in 1974
(Statistics Canada, 1974).  The closest is Projection B, based on a fertility of 2.2 and net immigration of
60,000 per year, which yielded a 2000 population of 30.4 million.  Especially in the context of the
changes in definition wherein the non-permanent residents are now considered part of the population,
and the adjustments now made for under-enumeration, these are rather accurate results.  For the
record, the band of projections for the year 2000 in this first generation was 28.2 to 34.1 million. 
However, there were compensating errors, with fertility being over-estimated and immigration being
under-estimated.  Consequently, in this Projection B, the population over 65 was projected to be
3,314,800 while the current estimate is 3,805,500, representing a shortfall of 13 percent.  In other
words, this projection had expected that 10.9 percent of the population would be aged 65 and over,
while the current estimate is 12.5 percent.
The United Nations projections for the world population have had similar success in the past 30 years,
with medium projections that have been within five percent of the mark.  Once again, there are
compensations, with the growth of Africa having been under-estimated and that of Europe over-
estimated.  
While the results are much better than those produced in the early post-war period, it may be because
the changes, especially in fertility, have not been at all as volatile as that experienced in the baby boom. 
When fertility has been within the range of 1.6 and 1.7 for 20 years in Canada, it is not hard to be close
to the mark in projections.  At the world level, it was much harder to predict when the fertility transition
would start in given regions, than to anticipate its trajectory once the decline had started.
As a last historical comment, consider the “reconciliation” released by the Department of Finance
(1996) at the time of the 17th review of the Canada Pension Plan (Table 1).  As can be seen, the
“blame” for having underestimated the costs in 1966 can be divided about equally into three
components: changed demographics, changed economics and enrichment of benefits.  The changed
demographics largely refers to not having anticipated below replacement fertility, because the first
projections had assumed a total fertility rate stabilizing at 3.0 births per woman.  Note that in 1964 the
total fertility rate was 3.5, having been as high as 3.9 over the period 1956-60.  
----Table 1 about here----
As of the 1972 review of the CPP, the ultimate fertility had been changed from 3.0 to 2.2 which made a
41.1 percentage point change in the pay-as-you-go rate estimated for 2030.  That is, after this second
revision, the changed demographics have accounted for only 1.5 percentage points in the 2030 pay-as-
you-go rate, or 22 percent of the change anticipated to 2030 in this 17th review.  Thus, even before
Statistics Canada returned to population projections, the Office of the Chief Actuary of the CPP was
doing better on anticipating changed demographics than changed economics or changed benefits. 
Nonetheless, the gap between anticipated and actual demographics remains substantial.
Given the changes that have occurred since the mid-1960s, a number of the underlying assumptions
have had to be revised (Beaujot and Richards, 1996).  The mid-1960s were a time of considerable
demographic growth in a relatively young population.  Families largely followed the breadwinner model,
with relatively few lone parents.  It was also a time of economic growth, with much confidence that the
future would be able to fund an expanding welfare state.  Socially, there was interest to expand social
security, especially to benefit the elderly who were a significant pocket of poverty (Myles, 2000). 
Given the relatively small numbers of elderly, it was possible to establish programs without particularly
high total costs, anticipating that economic growth would keep up to future costs.
The objectives of this paper are limited to the demographics.  After considering the assumptions
underlying fertility, mortality, international and internal migration, some results will be presented 
especially in terms of the ratio of beneficiaries to contributors.  The paper will end with some reflections
on policy that might seek to attain an optimal demographic future.
1.  Fertility
In 1964, the ultimate fertility was set at 3.0, this was changed to 2.2 in the 1st report of 1969, then to
2.1 in the 6th report of 1977, and later to 1.85 as of the 11th report of 1988.  In the 17th actuarial
report, the long term fertility is set at 1.7 births per woman (Table 2).  The current Statistics Canada
projections based on the 1996 census use assumptions of 1.3, 1.5 and 1.8 (Table 3).
----Table 2 and Table 3 about here----
It is useful to observe that most Canadian demographers involved in projections took some time to
conclude that fertility would go below replacement and stay there .  In the first generation of
projections, a high of 2.6 was used, anticipating that what comes down would go back up again.  The
evolving demographics even passed through the low estimate of 1.8 by 1978, four years after the
projections were released.  While lower numbers were subsequently used for the high projection, the
projections following the 1976, 1981 and 1986 censuses all used replacement fertility as a high
assumption, just as those following the 1971 census had used it as a medium assumption (Table 3). 
There has been a tendency for demographers to consider that there is something magical about 2.1: if
fertility is going down it will stabilize at 2.1; if it is below replacement it will return to 2.1.  The same
applies to United Nations projections, with a focus on when less developed countries will reach
replacement fertility, and the use replacement fertility for the ultimate high assumption for more
5developed countries.  Evolving patterns in a number of countries show that the trends pay no attention
whatsoever to the figure of 2.1.
This fixation with replacement fertility can also be seen in the CPP projections, which were still
anticipating an ultimate fertility of 2.0 in 1985 even though we had not seen such figures since 1976. 
When the assumption was changed to 1.85 it was held at this level into the 16th report (1993), even
though we had not seen such figures since 1975.  This tendency to anticipate higher fertility is also
observed in the sensitivity analyses done in the CPP reviews.  For instance, in the 14th report, the
sensitivity studied was between 1.85 and 1.95 (Office of the Superintendent, 1991: 9).  Given that
lower fertility presents more problems for the plan, one would think that sensitivity analyses would
especially focus on the prospect of fertility being lower than anticipated.  In effect, the 17th review used
a sensitivity between fertility of 1.5 and 1.9 (Office of the Superintendent, 1998: 35).
Clearly, the questions regarding fertility are whether it has bottomed out, might it decrease further in the
long term, and might it increase? Reflections on these questions need to consider the dynamics of
fertility in modern societies.  Most of the theoretical interpretations start with a demographic
transition from high to low levels of childbearing (Beaujot, 2000: 240-242).  While this first transition is
clearly over, the dynamics of a second transition are less understood.  The first transition involved a
change especially in the economic value and cost of children, and a changed cultural orientation toward
the advantages of controlling one’s reproductive destiny.  The second transition has especially involved
family change.  Observing similar changes over a number of modern societies, Lesthaeghe (1995) has
proposed that there are three stages in this transformation.  The first stage, from about 1960 to 1970
involved the end of the baby boom, the end of the trend toward younger ages at marriage, and the
beginning of the rise in divorces.  The second stage from 1970 to 1985 involved the growth of
common law unions and eventually of children in cohabiting unions.  The third stage since 1985
involves a plateau in divorce, an increase in post-marital cohabitation (consequently a decline in re-
marriage), and a plateau in fertility due in part to higher proportions of births after age thirty.
----Table 4 about here----
Table 4 presents some statistics that capture these trends in the Canadian case.  In terms of the first
stage, the average births per woman, as measured by the total fertility rate, had reached a peak of 3.9
in 1957, declined to 2.2 in 1971, and has been very stable at about 1.6 to 1.7 births per woman over
the whole period 1980 to 1996 (into the third stage).  The median age at first marriage declined over
this century to reach a low of just over 21 years for brides and 23 years for grooms in the early 1970s,
then increased to ages 26 and 28 for women and men respectively in 1996.  The law permitting
divorces on grounds other than adultery dates only from 1968.  Per 100,000 married women, there
were under 200 divorces in each year over the period 1951-1966 compared to 1,000 in 1976 and
1,200 in 1996.  Cohabiting unions were not specifically enumerated in the 1976 census, although some
0.7 percent of couples indicated that they were living common-law.  By 1986, most of the Statistics
Canada data no longer distinguished between married and cohabiting couples.  The 1996 census
6determined that 13.7 percent of couples were cohabiting.  The 1995 General Social Survey found that
among persons born between 1951 and 1970, two out of five have lived in a cohabiting union, and over
half of first unions taking place since 1985 have been cohabitations rather than marriages (Dumas and
Bélanger, 1997: 135, 139).  The proportion of births occurring to women who are not married, and
who are now largely cohabiting, increased from 9 in 1971 to 36 percent in 1996.  In the third stage, we
find that by 1990, half of divorced persons aged 30-39, and more than a third of those aged 40-49,
were in cohabiting relationships (Dumas and Péron, 1992: 50).  Besides the stable fertility of 1.7
births per woman over the period 1980-96, the proportion of births occurring to women aged 30 and
over increased from 19.6 percent in 1976 to 43.7 percent in 1996.  These changes in births, marriage,
cohabitation and divorce have brought fewer children, but also a higher proportion of children who are
not living with both biological parents.  In particular, lone-parent families as a proportion of all families
with children increased from 11.4 in 1961 to 22.3 in 1996.
These data also confirm the uniqueness of the 1950s as a period between the two demographic
transitions.  Various authors have observed that this was a period when life was family centred.  Not
only was this the peak of the baby boom, but it continued the trend of a marriage rush, as marriage
occurred at young ages and high proportions of persons married at least once in their lives.  It was
possibly a "golden age of the family," where many families corresponded to the ideal of domesticity, and
consequently there was less variability (Skolnick, 1987: 6-16).  However, not all was ideal in this
golden age, with women in particular growing restless for more diversified roles and opportunities. The
unusualness of the immediate post-war period indicates that it should not be used as a base for
projecting trends.  
While the second transition has involved much change, especially in terms of the flexibility for entering
and exiting from unions, it is useful to recognize that there are also some stable patterns.  There is a
delay in entry into marriage, and even into relationships, and thus a higher proportion of young persons
living in the parental home or on their own.  But at ages 30-54 there is a strong commonality of
experience involving living in a relationship, having children and working (Beaujot, 1995a).  For older
persons, there is also an increase in living alone, due in part to differential mortality of women and men. 
However, in the middle of adult ages there is not much change in the propensity to live alone.  In some
regards non-traditional families have increased, in particular lone-parent families, cohabiting couples,
couples without children, and living alone.  However, in some other regards families and households
have become less diversified: households now mostly consist either of one family with no additional
persons, or of one person living alone (Péron et al., 1999).
Returning to the fertility trend, the period 1961-76 saw much change in levels, while the subsequent 20
years has seen remarkably stable patterns, with cohort fertility around 1.8 births per woman (Beaujot,
2000: 234-237).  What has changed in the last 20 years is the age patterns, toward later ages at
childbearing (Tables 5 and 6).
   ----Tables 5 and 6 about here----
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analysis: proximate factors, the value and cost of children, and the place of women and men in relations
of production (Beaujot, 2000: 243-265).  
The proximate factors of childbearing that are particularly relevant are the later entry into unions,
higher cohabitation, and more secure contraception.  While births clearly occur in cohabiting unions, the
rates are lower than in marriages (Beaujot, 1995a: 50; Dumas and Bélanger, 1997: 159; Dupuis, 1998:
3).  In addition, the instability of relationships is probably the main reason why people do not have the
intended number of children.  The increased security of contraception does not apply to teenagers,
where fertility rates have been stable over the last 20 years, in spite of half of pregnancies being aborted
(Beaujot, 2000: 301, 305; Wadhera and Millar, 1997).  
The value and cost of children to parents has changed in a variety of ways, but it is useful to appreciate
that children still represent important values to most adults.  One value can be called the joy of
interacting with children, seeing them grow, and the sometimes unexpected joys of interacting with adult
children.  Another value is the security of having someone in life; given that marital relationships are less
secure, children represent a kind of insurance against the risk of being alone in life.  The costs of
children include the direct and opportunity costs, along with psychic costs like those associated with
labour force withdrawal or interruptions, and the risk of being left alone to raise children.  
At the macro level, it is particularly useful to consider childbearing in the context of the place of women
and men in relations of production.  In that light, the time trend in fertility and labour force
participation is particularly useful to consider (Beaujot, 2000: 259).  Many have observed that
childbearing has gone down as women’s labour force participation has gone up.  However, it should be
observed that this inverse relation is largely limited to the period 1960-1975.  Before 1960, the
relationship was not inverse as women were having more children, but also staying at school longer and
participating more in the labour force.  In the last 20 years, fertility has been stable while labour force
participation has continued to increase, although less so in the early 1990s.  My interpretation would be
that the contradictions between production and reproduction are less significant when there are one or
two children, when these few children are born later, and when men take more of the responsibility for
caring activities (Beaujot, 2000: 175-230).  In the period 1976-96, the difficult economic situation of
young men may have contributed as much as the higher labour force participation of women.  As there
is a greater orientation toward co-providing and co-parenting, the average age at childbearing will
probably continue to increase.  This reflects the needs of both men and women to delay childbearing
until they are better able to handle the trade-offs between investing in themselves and investing in
reproduction.  There are some indications from Sweden that women have more births when men show
a  greater willingness to absorb some of the cost of children (Olah, 1996).  Nonetheless, couples who
have a more balanced division of both paid and unpaid work are more likely to be living with fewer
children (Beaujot, 2000: 225).
In light of these observations, I would not anticipate a significant further reduction in childbearing.  It
8may even be that the 1.55 which we see in 1997 under-estimates the levels given the continuing trend
toward delayed childbearing.  Anticipated childbearing, especially for younger persons, is significantly
above these levels (Table 7).  Especially if we manage to have supportive policies, on which I will
return, it may be that 1.6 or even 1.7 remains a good prognosis for the long term future.  While it is
necessarily dated, cohort fertility is at 1.75.  That is, I would suggest a figure higher than the 1.5 used as
the medium assumption by Statistics Canada.  Nonetheless, sensitivity analyses should be undertaken
with fertility of 1.3 and 1.8 which are the low and high assumptions from Statistics Canada.
----Table 7 about here----
2.  Mortality
Turning to mortality, we can make a similar use of past projections to the effect that anticipated change
has been conservatively projected in the assumptions adopted.  Just as it was hard to think that fertility
could move permanently to below replacement levels, the tendency has been to anticipate a certain
capping of improvements in life expectancy.  Notice, for instance, that the ultimate life expectancy has
had to be increased from generation to generation in the projections, and that it has never been
decreased.  Notice also that the tendency to under-project the change in fertility and mortality both
work in the same direction of under-projecting pension recipients in comparison to contributors.  As a
specific example, the first generation of Statistics Canada projections had used an ultimate life
expectancy of 70.2 for men and 78.4 for women, which was to be reached in 1986, while the 1996
estimates are 75.7 for men and 81.4 for women (Statistics Canada, 1999b: 10).  Since the fourth
generation, the Statistics Canada projections have used more than one set of assumptions, but the
medium projections from the latest generation still use an ultimate life expectancy of only 80.0 for men
and 84.0 for women (Table 3).  The ultimate life expectancy underlying the 17th revision of the Canada
Pension Plan is 80.2 for men and 87.7 for women (Office of the Superintendent, 1998: 20; 1993: 35).
Another example of this conservative orientation occurs in the special attention to AIDS in the
projections for the Canada Pension Plan (e.g.  Office of the Superintendent, 1988: 41; 1993: 35-37). 
While incorporating AIDS makes for a more fully elaborated projection of mortality, which has been
necessary in the case of Africa, exponential growth can sometimes be short-lived, even in the case of a
disease for which there is no cure.  
There seems to be a natural tendency to pay attention in particular to things that are getting worse,
without paying sufficient attention to things which are getting better.  As of 1971, it was thought that the
improvements in life expectancy were reaching some limit, and in effect the improvements had been
declining from census to census, yet the changes over the period 1971-76 were larger than had been
observed since 1951-56.  It was also being anticipated that the divergence between women and men
would continue to grow (Gee and Veevers, 1983).  At a 1978 conference, I proposed that the 1976
divergence, of 7.3 years, was the end of an era of increasing differences.  In effect, this divergence has
now decreased to 5.8, not because women are dying more as some pessimists had thought, but
9because men have made significant gains.  
It was largely unanticipated in the early 1970s that adult mortality would recede significantly.  In effect,
much of the previous gains had been due to reductions in infant and childhood mortality, along with less
deaths of women in childbirth, and by the early 1970s there was little room for further improvements in
these forms of mortality.  But we subsequently saw improvements in cardiovascular mortality, then in
accidental deaths, and now in cancer mortality (Dumas and Bélanger, 1997: 49-66; Belliveau and
Gaudette, 1995).  That is, all three of the modern causes of death are in decline.  We can usefully
speak of a fourth phase of the epidemiological transition toward delayed degenerative diseases and
hybristic causes (Bah and Fernando, 1991).  Delayed degenerative means that cardiovascular and
cancer deaths are occurring at older ages.  Hybristic mostly means “man made,” an over-confidence
that produces recklessness in the face of danger.  Certainly HIV-AIDS follows this pattern in terms of
reckless sexual activity, however in other regards such as driving too fast and especially drinking and
driving, the risks have declined.
The proximate factor or cause of death, requires a fuller analysis in terms of risk factors and treatment. 
It is probably safe to say that, for many major causes of death, both of these are in significant
improvement, and there is room for further change.  In terms of risk factors, with the exception of
certain categories of youth, there is increased concern about health in areas ranging from diets and
exercise, to harmful substances like smoke (Galambos and Tilton-Weaver, 1998; Millar and Beaudet,
1996).  For accidental deaths, not only are there concerns with regard to greater safety measures at
home, at work and on roads, but there has been a greater recognition of certain dangers such as
drinking and driving.  Especially with regard to cancer where the declines are slight, environmental
quality may be an important avenue thought which to reduce risks, but this may be particularly difficult
to achieve in a world where standards of living depend on high use of energy and other environmentally
unfriendly forms of consumption.  
It is the treatment factors that are particularly hard to predict, because they involve scientific and
technological advances.  While we complain about the under-funding of the health system, and rent
seekers in that system are particularly apt at pointing to the deficit, there are several bases for optimism. 
First there is the high quality of the personnel in the health system, which would predict technological
advance.  Secondly, there is a public that is very sympathetic to further public spending for health. 
Finally, there is a growing willingness to seek help from the health system; the interactions with the
system are increasing much faster than population growth or aging would predict.
While it is easy to have 20/20 hindsight to the effect that we were conservative in anticipating past
changes, are we being conservative in anticipating further changes? I think so.  In the high assumption
from Statistics Canada, the ultimate life expectancy is 81.5 for men and 85.0 for women.  The
reduction of the differential, to 3.5 years, is in the right direction, but it could even be lower.  Without
having any data, Keyfitz (1989) has suggested that the biological basis for this differential could be as
low as three years.  The United Nations uses a projection model where the highest possible life
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expectancy is 85.  Why not use that for Canada, which is among the handful of top counties in the
world.  Thus I would propose figures of 83.5 for men and 86.5 for women.  Around this figure, the
sensitivity analysis which uses 50% and 150% of the improvements in rates by cause of death seems
sensible.
3.  Immigration
Mortality has a certain simplicity in the sense that everyone dies, and only once, of a given cause, and
there are also certain biological constraints for fertility, but migration is considerably more complex. 
Some live and die in the same place, others are always moving, and some even return to where they
started.  While people are adventurous, especially when they are young adults, my orientation is to think
that there is a natural tendency not to move. 
Staying represents integration in family and community, and consequently it is at life course stages and
other circumstances when individuals are less integrated that there is a tendency to move.  Contrary to
the view that there would be more and more movement in a modern world, much movement is
associated with life course changes like leaving home, going to school, getting a job, starting or ending a
relationship, retiring and entering an old-folks home.  When people are at stages where they are more
prone to move, the push and pull factors have much to do with where they move (Beaujot, 1991: 162-
164; Goldscheider, 1971).  
Especially when considering international migration, there are also various barriers between places of
origin and potential places of destination.  These barriers, represented especially by policy, are
probably the main way in which to understand shifting trends (Beaujot and Matthews, 2000).  At the
very least, we need to appreciate that levels of immigration are a function of things happening within
Canada and others happening outside of the country, both in the short and longer terms.
In some ways, the only regularity that can be seen in immigration to Canada is that when the trend has
been upward it has ultimately come down, and when the trend has been downward it has ultimately
gone back up (Beaujot, 1998b: 97).  Thus the key difficulty has been to predict the point of inversion. 
Given the near impossibility to predict these short term fluctuations, the tendency has been to hold
immigration constant, either in terms of absolute numbers, net numbers, or as a proportion to population
size.  Thus the challenge in formulating assumptions is that of choosing an appropriate figure to hold
constant.  
As seen in Table 2, the Canada Pension Plan projections were using a net migration rate of 0.50
percent of population as of the first report, which was reduced as low as 0.32 in the early 1980s, then
increased to 0.60 in the 17th report.  Clearly, the lower levels in the early 1980s reflected the
orientation of the then Liberal government to reduce immigration during this economic recession, in spite
of the argument from the Conservative opposition who saw this as a mistake.
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The Statistics Canada assumptions have followed a similar pattern, but we can also see a tendency to
increase the medium assumption from the first (1971 census) to the fifth (1991 census) projections
(Table 3).  The range in assumptions has also increased over these projections, in part because actual
immigration was soon above the high assumptions that were used in generations 3 and 4 (1981 and
1986 censuses).  Nonetheless, I have argued that the range used in the projections following the 1991
census was excessive.  While it represents 1.0 percent of the receiving population, it is hard to envisage
a scenario where immigration would be in excess of 300,000 per year, year after year.  The
demographers may have been too susceptible to the posturing that was occurring in political parties.
What drives immigration? There is clearly no shortage of a potential pool of people who want to come
to Canada, and these outside pressures are probably increasing (Golini, 1996; Castles and Miller,
1993).  The factors that have been analysed from within Canada have been especially economic and
demographic, but I would propose that they should be seen as more social and political.  At various
times, the case has been proposed that Canada needs immigrants, either for economic growth or to
overcome demographic stagnation.  These are strong arguments.  While immigration is probably
favourable to economic growth, is it far from being a major factor (Economic Council of Canada,
1991).  Immigration can sustain demographic growth, but it can do little to counter the more serious
problem of population aging.  
The fact that unemployment is one of the better predictors of immigration can probably be mostly
interpreted in social and political terms (Veugelers and Klassen, 1994; Foot, 1994; Simmons, 1994). 
In spite of the research to the effect that immigration contributes little to unemployment, there is a social
and political tendency to be less favourable to immigration when economic conditions are more difficult
(Palmer, 1996, 1999).  That is, when the social mood is more favourable, there is a tendency to see
immigration positively, especially in terms of increasing the cultural richness of Canada and  contact with
a broader pluralistic world, to say nothing of our interest in being generous to the disadvantaged.  When
the climate is less favourable, there is a sense that we should first look after ourselves, or a felt need to
retrench, to reduce the pace of change.  Some theorists have seen natural tendencies toward opening
and closing over intervals of time (Klapp, 1978).
Politically, the orientation has often been to follow the social climate, and thus not to deviate excessively
from public opinion.  Nonetheless, it is interesting to observe that the Conservative government
continued its orientation of “planned controlled growth” through the recession of the early 1990s.  The
party was on record as having judged it a mistake on the part of the Liberal government to have
reduced immigration in the recession of the early 1980s.  In addition, the governing party was at an all-
time low in political opinion in the early 1990s, having alienated various groups from the West who
wanted more say in government, to business interests, and those from Quebec seeking a renewed
constitution.  It may be that the party saw in the interest groups surrounding immigration, both multi-
cultural groups and business interests, as one of the ways through which they could make public opinion
inroads in these difficult political times (Foot, 1994).
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If this interpretation is correct, to the effect that receptivity to immigration is mostly a function of social
climate and political opportunity, then predictions of changes in trends are particularly difficult.  This
also indicates that extending a short term level (say the last three or five years) is subject to
considerable difficulty.  However, an average over a longer term has a better chance of catching the
swings in terms of both opening and closing.  For instance, as a low assumption, one could use the
average of the entire post-war period, and as a high assumption that of the past ten years (150,000 and
200,000 respectively).  
Reporting in the middle of the 1980s, the MacDonald Commission had suggested moving toward levels
of immigration that corresponded to the average for the entire post-war period, which could be justified
in the sense that the country had accommodated and taken advantage of such levels in the past and
could also do so in the future (Table 8).  The average of the 1990s may be risky because it is still a
short period which may have been unusual for the political reasons just mentioned.  It does have the
advantage of providing a high assumption, although still not as high as the 270,000 used in the current
generation from Statistics Canada.  Since only one assumption is to be used, how about the average of
the two, that is 175,000 along with a sensitivity analysis using the high and low from Statistics Canada
(150,000 and 270,000).  
----Table 8 about here----
There is a certain demographic elegance to using rates rather than absolute numbers.  For emigration, a
rate expressed either per population or per immigration makes much sense.  It is the existing population
that is emigrating, and the two flows are linked because a considerable proportion of emigration consist
of people who were immigrants (Beaujot and Rappak, 1989).  However, for immigration, the base
should be the population outside of the country, and the political discussion of levels mostly focuses on
absolute numbers.
Nonetheless, it is useful to convert the above assumptions into net immigration rates.  For the low
assumption, the average immigration rate for the period 1951-2001 is 0.688 (Table 8).  In this period,
emigration represented 35 percent of immigration, thus the net immigration rate would be 0.45.  In the
period 1991-2001, the immigration rate of 0.64 needs to be reduced by an emigration of 23 percent to
produce a net immigration rate of 0.49.  For one assumption, the average of the two would be 0.47.
4.  Internal migration between Quebec and the ROC
The proposed conceptualizations of internal migration are indicated above, where social and life-course
questions, associated with extent of integration in community, are more responsible for whether people
move, and economic questions more responsible for the choice of destination when people do move.  
In the Statistics Canada projections, alternative scenarios of internal migration are suggested to the
provinces in order to arrive at a set of compatible alternative assumptions where each province feels
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comfortable with at least one of the scenarios.  An analysis of past projections has shown that the
central interprovincial migration assumption has tended to under-project both out-migration for
provinces losing population and in-migration for those gaining (Beaujot, 1997).  This is probably a
natural tendency in projections, to downplay the role of volatile factors, especially if they are politically
sensitive.
The question of internal migration becomes simpler when only Quebec and the rest of Canada are
considered as regions.  Nonetheless, it is useful to observe that there is considerable in and out
movement, producing a net which could easily change.  For instance, as a yearly average in 1996-97
and 1997-98, there were 40,732 departures from Quebec and 23,305 arrivals from other provinces,
producing a net of only 17,445.  The net has been negative each year over the period 1976-98, ranging
from 4,774 to 30,382.  The trend was downward from 1976-81 to 1986-91.  The average over the
period 1986-98 is 10,600.  The CPP assumption in the Seventeenth Actuarial Report uses a net
departure of 10,000 per year (Office of the Superintendent, 1998: 20).  This remains a reasonable
assumption.
 
A better analysis of this question would take advantage of the rather different migration propensities of
the French and English speaking populations of Quebec and the Rest of Canada.  In terms of the
French of Quebec and the English of the Rest of Canada, these two regions operate somewhat as
separate countries in migration terms (Termote, 1995; Newbold, 1996).  Recent immigrants are also
more likely to move, and it is largely for reasons of lack of linguistic assimilation into the French
majority, and the propensity of the non-French immigrations to leave, that immigration does not work
as well for Quebec as for the rest of Canada (Beaujot, 1998a).  If a more careful analysis was to be
made in terms of propensities to move between Quebec and the rest of Canada, it would take into
account the significantly different rates for these various population groups.
The general tendency for Quebec to lose population through internal migration is likely to continue. 
This relates to a variety of factors including the general westward movement on the continent, and
particularly the ascendancy of Toronto over Montreal as the economic metropolis of the country
(Beaujot and McQuillan, 1982: 165; Beaujot, 1991: 153-154).  Toronto profits from various factors,
including its closer cultural connection to the United States.
5.  Demographic implications on population size and age structure
In terms of size, the projections over the past quarter century have been quite accurate.  For instance,
in the first generation there were compensating errors with both fertility and mortality being over-
projected, and immigration under-projected.  These factors have not produced compensating errors
with regard to the age structure.  The over-projected fertility and mortality have both under-projected
population aging.  Immigration has less impact on the age structure, but the assumption has typically
involved using a constant age distribution of immigrants at arrival, while their average age at arrival has
in effect increased over time as the world population has aged.  The average age of immigrants at arrival
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has increased from 25 years in 1956-76 to 30 years in 1994-96 (Beaujot and Matthews, 2000).
Consequently, all of these factors have under-projected the population aging.
According to the United Nations (1999: 128-129) estimates and projections, Canada’s population
grew from 13.7 million in 1950 to 31.4 million in 2000.  Over the next 50 years, the high, medium and
low projections are 44.7, 42,3 and 31.3 million.  While this represents slower growth, the change is not
as significant as in the case of Europe which increased from a total size of 544 million persons in 1950
to 726 million in 2000, but the high, medium and low projections are 746, 628 and 550 million in 2050
(Monnier, 2000).  The 17th revision of the Canada Pension Plan used projections that arrived at 44.1
million in 2050 and 55.3 million in 2100 for the national total.  The current generation of Statistics
Canada projections has yet to be extended beyond 2026, but the earlier generation gave figures ranging
from 35.1 to 50.6 in 2041.  
The Statistics Canada projections from the 1986 census had indicated that, with a fertility constant at
1.7 births per woman, the natural increase would become negative around 2020 and population would
start to decline after 2026 with an immigration of 140,000, or after 2035 with an immigration of
200,000.  These results and subsequent analyses on questions like labour force growth may have been
part of the reason for moving to higher immigration levels by the late 1980s.  The projections based on
the 1991 census indicate that a total fertility rate of 1.5 and immigration of 150,000 would show
population decline only after 2033.  Combinations of fertility at 1.7 and immigration at 250,000 show
continued growth to the end of the projection period, that is 2041.  In the projections based on the
1996 census, a fertility of 1.3 and immigration of 150,000 shows negative natural increase after 2015,
and a fertility of 1.5 with immigration of 210,000 shows this negative after 2024.  However, all the
projections show continued growth until the end of the projection period, that is 2026.
Aging is more advanced in Europe.  The proportion aged 60 and over in Canada is 16.5 percent in
2000, compared to 19.5 percent as the European average (Monnier, 2000: 3; United Nations, 1999:
252, 253, 255).  The difference is largely a function of the baby boom who will be crossing the 60 year
old threshold from 2006 to 2026.  After that point, the Canadian age structure will not look that
different from that of other developed countries, and Canada will be older than any country is now (see
also  bottom panel of Table 9).
----Table 9 about here----
For purposes of the Canada Pension Plan, the ratio of population aged 20-64 to 65+ is a particularly
useful measure of the age structure, in terms of beneficiaries and contributors.  Table 9 presents such
figures from 1951 to 2100, using the results from Statistics Canada, various reviews of the Canada
Pension Plan, along with simulations by Denton and Spencer.  Even though it was based on a fertility of
2.2 rather than the high assumption of 2.6, Projection B from the first generation of Statistics Canada
projections, which has very accurately projected the total population 25 years later, in effect
significantly under-projected the beneficiaries in comparison to the contributors.  The same applies to
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the earlier projections from the Canada Pension Plan for the year 2000.  As can be seen, the revisions
of the Canada Pension Plan projections have been in the direction of reducing the proportion of
contributors in relation to beneficiaries.  Overall, it is useful to observe that this ratio changed from 6.97
in 1951, to 6.49 in 1976 and 4.86 in 2001, and can be expected to decrease to about 2.9 in 2026, 2.4
in 2050 and 2.2 in 2100 (Table 9).  These are rather amazing numbers: what was once close to seven
persons in the labour force ages per person at retirement ages, has changed to under five, and will
further change to under three by 2026 and eventually to close to two persons in labour force ages per
person at retirement ages.
Various analyses have been made on the basis of population projections to further decompose these
trends in age composition.  Based on the projections from the 1991 census, George et al.  (1997)
used a sensitivity analysis that considered the range of assumptions and their impact on the size and age
composition.  Given the large range used in the immigration assumptions, it is understandable that these
played the largest role for the total population.  Nonetheless, on a year to year basis, after 2035, a
difference of 0.4 births would have more impact on the changing size than a difference of 180,000
immigrants per year.  The three factors of fertility, mortality and migration also have differential roles for
the various parts of the age structure.  In particular, alternative fertility assumptions, followed by those
for immigration, have more impact on the population aged 0-14; immigration has the largest impact on
the population aged 15-64, followed by mortality and fertility over the longer term; for those aged 65
and over, it is the alternative mortality assumptions that have the largest role, followed by immigration.
Ryder (1997) used alternative assumptions to make projections to the point of stability.  In the sub-
replacement model, fertility is fixed at its current level and there is no migration.  This yields a
population that grows over the next twenty years, but then declines to 18.0 million or 60 percent of its
current size after 100 years.  In the replacement fertility model, fertility is immediately raised to
replacement, with no immigration; the population in 100 years is 33.2 million or 12.3 percent larger than
at the outset.  In the model called replacement migration, fertility stays at current levels but there is a
level of immigration sufficient to yield the same ultimate population size as in the replacement fertility
model.  Of interest here is that the net immigration in this third model is 167,225 persons per year, that
is about 10 percent lower than that of the 1991-96 period.  This is an important result, implying that an
immigration of slightly above 200,000 is sufficient to avoid population decline.  Using the average
emigration of the 1991-96 period, the immigration would need to be 213,000.  Using the average
emigration of the 1971-96 period, the immigration would need to be 220,000 per year.  This is similar
to results from Avery and Edmonston (1988) showing that a net migration of 163,000 (or immigration
of 213,000) prevents population decline under a fertility assumption of 1.7 births per woman.
In the stable population models that Ryder (1997) has used for projections into the future, the median
age at equilibrium is 45.0 years with present fertility and no migration, compared to 40.9 with
replacement fertility and no migration, and 44.0 with present fertility and sufficient migration to assure
population replacement.  That is, compared to zero migration, a net immigration of 167,225 per year
(immigration of some 210,000) reduces the average age by 1.5 years in the stable population that is
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reached at the point of equilibrium.  Since the median age in Canada increased from 31.6 years in 1986
to 35.3 in 1996, this level of net migration would ultimately reduce the average age by some two and a
half years of aging.  Clearly, the movement from current fertility to replacement fertility would have a
larger impact, ultimately reducing the average age by 4.1 years.  Even in this replacement migration
population, the age structure of immigrants does not have a large impact on that of the total population. 
For instance, if the mean age of migrants at arrival is 25, the mean age of the population is 44.6,
compared to 45.7 if the mean age is 35 at arrival (Ryder, 1997: 18).
Looking at the impact of alternative levels of immigration, Denton et al.  (1997) use immigration
levels in 100,000 increments ranging from zero to 500,000, with fertility of 1.64, showing projection
results every five years.  The zero and 100,000 immigration assumptions involve population decline
after 2016, while all others show continuous growth to the end of the projection period in 2036.  In the
zero assumption, the 2036 population is 0.7 percent smaller than that of 1996, in the 100,000
assumption the overall growth is 15.5 percent to 2036, and these figures become 31.7 percent with
200,000 immigrants, 47.8 with 300,000, 64.0 with 400,000 and 80.2 with 500,000.  This might be
compared to the 86.3 percent growth that Canada experienced in the previous forty years, 1956-1996. 
However, growth over the period 1956-1996 occurred with a very different combination of fertility and
immigration experiences, since the average immigration in that period was 155,000 per year.
 Based on a constant age structure of immigrants on arrival.  Denton et al.  (1997: 41) produce the
following proportions over 65:
Immigration level  Percent over 65 
2016 2036
zero  18.1  29.1
100,000  17.3  26.7
200,000  16.6  24.8
300,000  16.0  23.4
400,000  15.5  22.2
500,000  15.0  21.3
In comparison, the proportion aged 65 and over changed from 10.5 percent in 1986 to 12.2 in 1996,
or 1.7 percentage points over ten years.  In 2016, each additional 100,000 immigrants would have
reduced the proportion over 65 by some 0.6 percentage points, which is comparable to the aging that
occurs over about four years in current conditions.  In 2036, each 100,000 immigrants would have
reduced the proportion over 65 by 1.6 percentage points.  While the impact is larger as one moves
further into the future, the assumption of a constant age structure of immigrant arrivals becomes
increasingly unrealistic.
Nonetheless, each of these scenarios involves a population that ages considerably from its present state. 
Even with 500,000 immigrants per year, the proportion over 65 would increase from 12.2 in 1996 to
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15.0 in 2016 and 21.3 in 2036.  Denton et al.  (1997: 23) conclude that “immigration is clearly not an
effective tool for offsetting the process of population aging.”
Various calculations have been made of dependency ratios, seeking to measure those dependent on
persons who are at labour force ages, or employed.  These results show declines in dependency since
the baby boom period, and increases only after 2011 when the baby boom starts moving into
retirement ages.  In this regard, we are living in an ideal time as the proportion of children has declined
and the proportion of elderly has not risen that much, maximizing the proportion of persons at labour
force ages.  After 2011, all of the dependency measures and immigration levels show increased
dependency (Denton et al., 1997: 40-41).  Nonetheless, this dependency remains lower in 2036 than it
was in 1971 when the baby boom was at young ages.  These authors have also attempted various
simulations of immigration levels that might prevent the anticipated increase in dependency.  They find
that the levels would have to be far in excess of a million persons per year at the current age distribution
for immigrants (p.  20).
Another approach in measuring of the age distribution is to consider the growth of the labour force. 
There has been considerable growth of the labour force, especially as the baby boom entered the work
force, and women took paid employment.  The peak growth was a 17.9 percent increase between
1971 and 1976, and the growth has since declined to 4.2 percent between 1991 and 1996 (Denton et
al., 1997: 38-39).  At the same time, the contribution of net immigration to labour force growth has
increased from 9.6 percent in 1976-81 to 71.0 percent between 1991 and 1996.  Under their base
assumption of 200,000 immigrants per year, the size of the labour force declines slightly in the period
2026 to 2036, but the size in 2036 is 16 percent larger than in 1996.  They also attempt various
scenarios to determine the level of immigration that would be needed to maintain the labour force
growth that was experienced between 1986 and 1996.  For the period 1996-2006, an annual
immigration of some 227,000 would be sufficient, but after 2016 levels in excess of 500,000 would be
needed (p.  44).
However, there is nothing magical about the labour force growth rate of the 1986-96 period, which
was significantly lower than that of the earlier decade.  If one considers the alternative goal of avoiding
decline of the labour force, an immigration just above 200,000 per year is sufficient.  With zero net
immigration, the labour force would decline after 2006, with a total decline of some 20 percent in the
next two decades.  An immigration level of 100,000 per year involves a peak labour force size in 2016
with a decline of eight percent in the next fifteen years.  An immigration of 200,000 per year produces
labour force growth of 16 percent between 1996 and 2016 and basic stability to 2036.  In comparison,
an immigration of 300,000 per year produces a continuous labour force growth, for a total of 33
percent between 1996 and 2036.
Before turning to the next section on economic implications, it is useful to appreciate the demographic
implications  of a an aging population.  As the bulge in the population passes beyond childbearing
years, aging brings fewer births.  It also brings more deaths as more people are at ages where dying is
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more prevalent.  Some of the increased health costs are a function of the costs of dying, including the
period shortly before death, rather than being the direct health costs of an aging population.  As already
indicated, aging of the world population also tends to increase the age of immigrants at arrival.
6.  Possible economic implications of slower growth and aging
Other than an increase over the period from the mid 1980s to the early 1990s, population growth has
been on a downward trend since 1951-56 and this can be expected to continue (Denton and Spencer,
1997: 20).  Even though the demographic growth has been slowing down for some 45 years, and aging
has occurred for over a century, the labour force has not been subject to these consequences until more
recently.  Thanks to the baby boom and to the entry of women into the paid labour force, the labour
force has increased rapidly over the period 1961-81 and actually getting slightly younger over this same
1961-81 period (Denton and Spencer, 1998: 5).  Even in 1996, the male labour force was not older
than it was in 1966.  However, the population aging is now clearly affecting the labour force.  
It is useful to distinguish population aging at the various parts of the age structure, and its possible
differential effect.  Initially aging was a function of declining fertility; at first this was very slow because
infant and child mortality were also declining, making more surviving children.  This may be called aging
at the bottom, due to fertility reductions, and it was particularly rapid in the 1960s and 1970s.  As the
baby boom moved up into higher ages, we see aging at the middle, which affects labour force ages
since 1981.  Aging at the top is also a function of differential improvements in mortality for adults and
elderly, which have especially occurred since 1971.  This produces particularly rapid aging, due to low
fertility, lower mortality at older ages and the movement of the baby boom through the structure.  Aging
at the bottom, middle and top may have different consequences.  At the bottom it means fewer young
dependents, also liberating adults to be in the labour force.  At the top it can mean more older
dependents, especially as the frail elderly increase in relative size.  Aging in the middle can mean a
labour force that is less flexible but more experienced.
Thus it is important to know what might be the impact of a labour force population that is both aging
and growing much slower.  Among the studies done for the Review of Demography and its Implications
for Economic and Social Policy (1986-92), two take a relatively optimistic attitude on this question,
while two others are more pessimistic.
Denton and Spencer (1988) emphasize the fact that an older labour force will be more experienced.  In
their model, the productivity of age groups is measured by income.  Since incomes rise with age, an
older labour force increases per capita incomes.  Fortin and Fortin (1987) consider that a labour force
that is growing less rapidly will need less new investments to accommodate new workers.  This would
permit "capital deepening" or more investments per worker and a higher quality labour force.  It will be
necessary to ensure improvement in the quality of the labour force, through emphasis on education,
training and retraining.
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Foot (1987) speaks especially of the disadvantages of an aging labour force in terms of reduced
flexibility.  There would be less geographic mobility, less mobility across sectors of the economy, and
consequently less possibility to accommodate changes in the relative growth of the various sectors.  An
older worker has less to gain in terms of increased lifetime earnings, and more to lose in terms of
seniority, through movement, training or change of occupation.  Similarly, Ryder (1985) is concerned
that a declining population would imply less entry into the labour force from below.  He suggests that
the future labour force will have characteristics that, in current arrangements, would imply less
productivity, vitality and flexibility.  We would lose a large part of the capacity to transform the
economy by means of new entrants to the labour force.
Lapierre-Adamcyk et al.  (1988) observe that the only demographic element that has enhanced
productivity over the period 1955-1985 has been a measure of level of education weighted by the age-
sex structure.  That is, the productivity of the economy benefited from a higher level of education,
especially for the young, and from a labour force that became younger and less male dominant.  This
could be interpreted by suggesting that younger workers and women, including those working part-
time, are exploited in the sense that they receive less income than their productivity would justify, while
older male workers receive more income for given levels of productivity.  An older labour force would
consequently cost more for a given unit of productivity.  If the Denton and Spencer (1988) simulations
have over estimated the productivity of older workers, this brings into question the results showing that
slower demographic growth brings higher per capita incomes.
Summarizing the thinking on the economic consequences of population aging along with slower growth
or decline, McNicoll (1986) concludes that the main effects, in terms of per capita economic growth,
are not serious, but the distributional effects may be more significant.  The distributional effect may
result from the reduced mobility prospects in a population that is less pyramidal.  With growing
demands for elderly benefits, especially in terms of health and pensions, there can also be a reduced
potential for the state to re-distribute in other directions, especially in favour of the young.  In terms of
political economy, there may also be negative consequences for an economy if the underlying
population is declining while other populations are growing.  Especially if standards of living are
increasing in these more rapidly growing populations, the older declining population may have less
power in the world economy.
McNicoll (1986) summarizes three main economic effects associated with persistent below
replacement fertility.  There is less labour force growth, but this can be compensated through higher
participation.  The reduced potential for innovation and technology because of a more slowly growing
labour force can be compensated through re-training.  The lower potential for investments and
consumer demand can be compensated through trade and different forms of consumption.  Given the
results from Lapierre-Adamcyk et al.  (1988) one might ask if the balance, even for these main
economic effects, might not be more negative when aging is occurring in the middle with an older labour
force and at the top with more frail elderly.  Much depends on the productivity of older workers.  In my
casual observation, some remain very productive but that is not true of many others.  That is, aging has
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been occurring for some time, and we may say that it has been accommodated.  However, the
dynamics may be different when they bring significant population aging at labour force ages.  The
potential for re-training may be over-estimated based on selective older workers.  More research is
needed on productivity by age and the factors that would ensure continued productivity in an aging
labour force.  Note also that immigration can be used to compensate for the lack of labour force entry,
but it has much less consequence on labour force aging.
7.  Population policy: can we endogenize the demographics? 
The invitation to the workshop encourages thinking on optimal demographic futures.  While it is not
popular to talk about population policy, let me finish with comments along this line.  Even the Cairo
conference on Population and Development tended to avoid setting demographic goals at the macro
level or promoting population policy, preferring instead to promote mechanisms and services that would
allow individuals to control their reproductive destiny.  In effect, there has been much repression in the
name of population control.  It is essential that ethical questions be brought forward and that only
acceptable means be adopted.  In terms of childbearing, as the Cairo conference indicates, people
should have the means to make free and responsible decisions on the number and timing of their
children.  Policy that would infringe on this human right must be condemned, along with deliberate
incentives that would constrain behaviour (United Nations, 1994: 32).  People should not be
constrained to have the children that they do not want, and they must be permitted to have the children
that they want.  However, I would argue that it is legitimate for the society to call for a certain behaviour
that would enhance collective well-being, in childbearing as in other domains.
Demographics are precisely at this juncture of individual and collective interests (Demeny, 1990).  The
number of children to have, and where to live, are immensely personal questions, but the society also
has an interest because these behaviours influence collective well-being.  The number and composition
of its membership is of clear interest to the whole society, and there is a legitimate basis for inter-
personal influences in regard to the associated behaviours which are far from purely private.
Malthus had long ago separated the means of controlling population between those that were
unacceptable (“positive checks” and “vice”) and those that were acceptable (“preventive checks”). 
Seeking to avoid the positive check of higher mortality, Malthus promoted delayed marriage and
responsible parenthood.  Not all fertility checks were seen as acceptable; as a “vice” he obviously
included infanticide, but also abortion, and even condoms which were used with prostitutes but did not
belong in the marriage bed.  The Cairo conference also did an excellent job of separating the
acceptable and unacceptable means to reduce fertility in today’s moral context.  That is, coercion and
other top-down approaches are judged unacceptable, while reproductive health is to be promoted. 
However, the conference spends much time on condemning the unacceptable means, and it tends to
focus on some acceptable means that are particularly difficult and expensive.  For instance, rather than
elaborate on family planning as an obvious means through which individuals and couples can control
their reproductive destiny, it focuses on the emancipation of women and sexual and reproductive rights
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(McIntosh and Finkle, 1995; Beaujot, 1995b).  While all these means, including social development
through education, health, security and equity, are important goals in and of themselves, they are among
the more difficult and costly means to achieve fertility reduction (see also Basu, 2000).
There is no institutional basis in Canada for evolving population policy in the sense of a vision of the
preferred demographic future and a discussion of the means to move in that direction.  In my view, this
might start with two elements: (1) the advantages of some population growth or at least avoiding
decline, and (2) slower rather than more rapid aging.  Substantial growth may be more economically
useful, or at least it has been in the past, but avoiding decline is probably more important from an
economic point of view (United Nations, 2000).  Decline would mean various superfluous investments
and difficult adjustments of various kinds, and it would include particularly significant aging.  The
environmental arguments point in particular to the disadvantages of high growth.  Population growth
could encourage more environmentally friendly consumption and technology, but there is no avoiding
the direct multiplier of population size on environmental impact, given our standards of living based on
high use of energy and other forms of damaging consumption (Daly, 1991).  In the context of
uncertainties associated with environmental questions, the wise course of action would be to seek to
minimize the impact (LeGrand, 1998).  
In terms of specific components, fertility is key for both growth and aging.  There is clearly limited
potential for leverage in regard to fertility, some would say there is none.  However, reflections on
countries that have particularly low fertility, for instance in Southern and Eastern Europe, suggest that
these very low levels occur when women have opportunities in education and the labour force, but the
family remains traditional (McDonald, 1997).  If women have to absorb the family work especially
once there are children, they are particularly oriented to emphasizing the public sphere where
opportunities are more equal.  Rather than policies that would enhance the traditional family, fertility in a
modern society may be sustained by policies that would reduce dependencies in families and that would
prompt a better sharing of earning and caring activities between men and women (Beaujot, 2000).  This
would not likely bring fertility above replacement, but it may allow more people to have the children that
they originally intended.  That is, we should seek to remove the barriers to childbearing, including the
gender barriers.
Mortality is easier since longer and healthier lives are a widely shared value.  As indicated earlier, in an
era of delayed degenerative and hybristic mortality, key are the risk factors and treatment.  This points
to the importance of continued public education on risk factors, along with advances in treatment.  It
also points to the various other bases for disadvantage that discourage individuals from taking control of
their lives.  Other risk factors are environmental, where more research is needed, but there is
considerable evidence on the impact of environmental quality on population health.  In effect, there is
more knowledge on the effect of environment on population than the effect of population on
environment.  But here again, the greater danger is the lack of political will to conclude from the
research in a policy direction.
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In terms of internal migration, the dilemmas include the contrasts between efficiency and equity; that
is, the movement of people serves the whole through greater efficiency, and the receiving areas in
particular, but areas of net departure are often more interested in equity.  For the benefit of
disadvantaged regions, moving people toward jobs will always need to be balanced with moving jobs
toward people.  
That leaves international migration, where the policy basis is best established.  While immigration
targets work quite well, there is need for more discussion on the basis for setting these targets in terms
of both number and composition.  Even the Immigration Legislative Review (1997: 2) observed that,
for many, levels of immigration were not an “intriguing topic” and that the important questions were Not
just numbers.  The costs and benefits of immigration to the receiving society need fuller analysis,
especially in terms of the differential costs/benefits to different interests and parts of the society.  For
instance, it is concluded in Sweden that by avoiding the cheap solution of guest workers, the society
was prompted to make more space for women in the labour force, including policies that would allow
workers to have children (Hoem and Hoem, 1996).  While immigration is appreciated in terms of
bringing diversity, richness, pluralism and contact with a broader world, population renewal that is
excessively based on migration rather than fertility means much change and possibly less potential for
socializing new members into a common society.  If one considers immigration in terms of pressures
from outside of Canada, one way to handle and control these pressures is through higher immigration,
along with fair trade and international assistance (Golini, 1996).  Clearly, higher immigration is of
interest to individuals who are seeking to migrate to Canada, and it is often of interest to sending
societies.
We may agree or disagree on these specifics, but the broader problem is the lack of an institutional
basis for policy that would seek to endogenize population.  Looking at the Australian case, McNicoll
(1995) finds that there are various impediments to population policy in liberal democracies.  Besides the
lack of a political basis for long-term planning, the emphasis on individual welfare, and the lack of
attention to scale, there is also a tendency for “government to see its constituency only in terms of
organized groups and its role that of arbitrating competing claims” (p.  18).  In the Canadian case, Pal
(1993) has analysed how various “civil society” groups, often set up by the state, are also seeking rents
through the political system and may control agendas based on specific interests.  It would appear that
these interests relate less to the population as a whole, than to specific concerns like those of family,
feminism, environment, health, multi-culturalism or refugees.  That is, the potential constituents to
discussion of population policy are absorbed in distinct political domains and they are consequently
responsive to separate rather than common interests.  Some of the constituents would even be against
any discussion of population policy (Hodgson and Watkins, 1997).  That is, even population policy may
be condemned as a “vice” because it can be used in a heavy-handed top-down manner.
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Table 1. Projected CPP costs in year 2030, showing reconciliation 
from 1964 and from 1972
Costs as precentage of
contributory earnings
Costs in 2030 as projected in 1964 5.5
Changed demographics 2.6
Changed economics 2.2
Enrichment of benefits 2.4
Disability 1.5
Costs in 2030 as projected in 1997 14.2
Costs in 2030 as projected in 1972 7.3
Changed demographics 1.5
Changed economics 2.2
Enrichment of benefits 1.7
Disability 1.5
Cost in 2030 as projected in 1997 14.2
Source: Department of Finance, 1996: 20 and special tabulations
from CPP model.
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Table 2. Summary of Key Ultimate Demographic Assumptions Used in Previous Reports 
and Assumptions by Author
Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Internal
Net Life Life Life Life Migration
Migration Expectancy Expectancy Expectancy Expectancy
Ultimate Rate at at
Canada as a % age 65 age 65
Report Valuation Fertility of the Males Females Males Females
# Date Rate Population 2050* 2050* 2050 2050
0 1964 3.00 0.50 n/a n/a
1 1969 2.20 0.50 n/a n/a
2 1972 2.20 0.50 n/a n/a
3 1973 2.20 0.50 n/a n/a
4 1973 2.20 0.50 n/a n/a
5 1973 2.20 0.50 n/a n/a
6 1977 2.10 0.47 16.0 20.7
7 1977 2.10 0.47 16.0 20.7
8 1982 2.00 0.32 17.1 22.4
9 1982 2.00 0.32 17.1 22.4
10 1985 2.00 0.32 17.3 22.4
11 1988 1.85 0.40 n/a n/a
12 1988 1.85 0.40 n/a n/a
13 1988 1.85 0.40 n/a n/a
14 1991 1.85 0.40 n/a n/a
15 1993 1.85 0.40 17.8 22.8
16 1993 1.85 0.40 17.8 22.8
17 1997 1.70 0.60 18.4 22.8 80.2            87.7            10000
18 2000 1.60 0.47* 83.5            86.5            10000
* Immigration of 175,000
Source: Special tabulation from Chief Actuary, CPP.
Assumptions for 2000 by author.
cpp.tables.xls 2 11:00 AM2000-05-10
Sheet 2
cpp.tables.xls 3 11:00 AM2000-05-10
Table 3. Assumptions underlying Statistics Canada projections from 1971 to 1996 censuses
Total fertility rate               Immigration                 Life expectancy M/F
Projection L M H L M H H M L
1971 census 1.8 2.2 2.6 120,000 … 160,000 70.2/78.3
1976 census 1.7 … 2.1 125,000 150,000 175,000 70.2/78.3
1981 census 1.4 1.66 2.2 100,000 … 150,000 74.9/81.6
1986 census 1.2 1.67 2.1 140,000 … 200,000 77.2/84.0
1991 census 1.5 1.7 1.9 150,000 250,000 330,000 81.0/86.0 78.5/84.0 77.0/83.0
1996 census 1.3 1.5 1.8 150,000 210,000 270,000 81.5/85.0 80.0/84.0 78.5/83.0
Source: Statistics Canada, 1974: 26, 59; 1979: 21, 29; 1985: 27, 41; 1990: 12, 26; 1994: 59
Statistics Canada, Demography Division, special tabluations
Table 4. Summary statistics on family change, Canada, 1941-96
1941 1951 1961 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996
Total fertility rate 2.8 3.5 3.8 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.6
(average births per women)
Median age at first marriage
Brides 23.0 22.0 21.1 21.3 21.6 22.5 23.9 25.1 26.3
Grooms 26.3 24.8 24.0 23.5 23.7 24.6 25.8 27.0 28.3
Divorces per 100,000
married couples - - 180 180 600 990 1180 1302 1235 1222
Common-law couples as a - - - - - - - - 0.7 6.4 8.2 11.2 13.7
percent of all couples
Births to non-married women
as a percent of all births 4.0 3.8 4.5 9.0 - - 16.7 18.8 28.6 36.3
Births to women aged 30+
as a percent of all births 35.6 36.2 34.1 21.6 19.6 23.6 29.2 36.0 43.7
Lone-parent families as a 
percent of all families 9.8 9.8 11.4 13.2 14.0 16.6 18.8 20.0 22.3
with children
Notes: For 1941-71 births to non-married women are designated as illegitimate births.
Data for 1995 are shown as 1996 for divorce and births to non-married.
Source: Beaujot, 2000: 89.
Table 5. Women by five year birth cohorts, 1927-1956, and number of children ever born, 1995
(1952-56) (1947-51) (1942-46) (1937-41) (1932-36) (1927-31)
Number of children
0 19.1 12.8 12.1 10.7 13.0 10.5
1 14.6 13.7 9.5 11.1 12.0 7.4
2 38.3 42.1 41.5 26.1 15.9 24.8
3 19.6 23.0 21.1 27.4 16.7 10.9
4 7.1 6.8 6.8 8.0 16.1 13.3
5+ 1.3 1.4 8.9 16.8 26.4 33.1
Children per women 1.85 2.03 2.33 2.77 3.12 3.41
Source: Beaujot, 2000: 236.
---Birth Cohort---
Table 6.  Distribution of age-specific fertility, Canada, 1966-96
1966 1976 1986 1996
15-19 8.5 9.4 7.3 6.8
20-24 30.1 29.8 24.9 21.1
25-29 29.1 35.6 37.3 33.6
30-34 18.4 17.9 22.6 26.8
35-39 10.2 5.9 6.9 10.0
40-44 3.4 1.2 1.0 1.6
45-49 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total Fertility Rate 2.81 1.80 1.60 1.62
Source: Beaujot, 2000: 237.
Table 7.  Intended number of children by age and sex, Canada, 1990
0 1 2 3 4+ Average
Males
15-29 6.0 4.9 52.2 26.3 10.6 2.31
30-34 8.5 9.8 49.4 23.3 9.1 2.19
35-39 10.5 10.2 52.6 17.0 9.7 2.10
40-44 13.0 13.0 42.7 21.9 9.1 2.03
Females
15-29 6.8 6.0 47.9 28.4 10.7 2.30
30-34 7.7 11.5 51.1 21.7 8.0 2.12
35-39 15.7 11.3 47.0 18.3 7.7 1.93
40-44 15.1 12.3 42.8 21.1 8.7 2.00
Source:  Beaujot, 2000: 236.
---Number of children intended---
Table 8. Immigration, emigration and contribution to population growth, Canada, 1851-2001.
Population
(at end of
period) Immigration
Average
immigration 
(% of population) Emigration
Contribution
to population
growth
1851
1851-61
1861-71
1871-81
1881-91
1891-1901
1901-11
1911-21
1921-31
1931-41
1941-51
1951-61
1961-71
1971-81
1981-91
1991-98
1991-
2001(est.)
2,523,000
3,230,000
3,689,000
4,325,000
4,833,000
5,371,000
7,207,000
8,788,000
10,376,700
11,506,700
14,009,400
18,238,200
21,962,082
24,820,382
28,030,864
30,300,422
31,048,284
352,000
260,000
350,000
680,000
250,000
1,550,000
1,400,000
1,200,000
149,000
548,000
1,543,000
1,429,000
1,429,000
1,381,000
1,556,000
1,881,000
1.22 %
0.75 %
0.87 %
1.49 %
0.49 %
2.46 %
1.75 %
1.25 %
0.14 %
0.43 %
0.96 %
0.71 %
0.61 %
0.52 %
0.67%
0.64%
170,000
410,000
404,000
826,000
380,000
740,000
1,089,000
970,000
241,000
379,000
463,000
707,000
636,000
490,000
328,000
428,000
23.0%
-32.6%
- 8.5%
-28.7%
-24.2%
44.1%
19.7%
14.5%
- 8.1%
7.9%
25.5%
21.7%
28.6%
27.7%
54.1%
48.2%
Sources: Beaujot and Matthews, 2000: Table 1.
Table 9. Ratio of population aged 20-64 to population aged 65+,
              Canada, 1950-2100, Europe, 2025-2050
Historical data
1951 6.97
1976 6.49
2001 4.86
Statistics Canada medium projections for 2001
Projected from 1971 census 5.35
Projected in CPP for 2000 2050 2100
Report 0 (1964) 6.22 5.61
Report 6 (1977) 5.62 3.47
Report 12 (1988) 4.83 2.48 2.32
Report 17 (1997) 4.92 2.39 2.17
Projected for 2026, by Statistics Canada in 1994
Low 2.77
Medium 2.91
High 2.92
Projected with alternate immigration levels 2016 2036
Zero immig 3.36 1.79
100,000 3.54 2.02
200,000 3.70 2.22
300,000 3.86 2.40
400,000 4.00 2.59
500,000 4.15 2.70
Projected by United Nations 2025 2050
Canada
Low 2.69 1.78
Medium 2.78 2.25
High 2.89 2.33
Europe
Low 2.78 1.72
Medium 2.81 1.92
High 2.88 2.25
Source: Statistics Canada, 1999: 249, 1974: 133; Denton et al., 1997: 39, 41
Special tabulations from CPP model; United Nations, 1999: 79-81, 253-255.
